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MANDATORY DISCLOSURE IN PRIMARY MARKETS 
 
Andrew A. Schwartz* 
 
Mandatory disclosure—the idea that companies must be legally 
required to disclose certain, specified information to public investors—is 
the first principle of modern securities law. Despite the high costs it 
imposes, mandatory disclosure has been well defended by legal scholars 
on two theoretical grounds: ‘Agency costs’ and ‘information 
underproduction.’ While these two concepts are a good fit for secondary 
markets (where investors trade securities with one another), this Article 
shows that they are largely irrelevant in the context of primary markets 
(where companies offer securities directly to investors). The surprising 
result is that primary offerings—such as an IPO—may not require 
mandatory disclosure at all. This profound insight calls into question the 
fundamental premises of the Securities Act of 1933 and similar laws 
governing primary offerings around the world. Reform of these rules could 
lead to a new age of simplified, low-cost primary offerings to the public, 
something that is already happening in New Zealand through its equity 
crowdfunding market. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Mandatory disclosure—the idea that companies must be required by law to 
disclose certain information to the investing public—is the foundation of modern 
securities law, both for primary markets—where companies offer securities directly 
to investors—and for secondary markets—where investors trade securities with one 
another. Mandatory disclosure imposes significant costs—it costs millions of dollars 
to produce the necessary disclosures for an IPO (initial public offering), not to 
mention the ongoing costs of quarterly and annual reporting1—to the point that the 
rule effectively excludes startups and small businesses from going public. Indeed, 
the number of IPOs has sharply decreased in recent years for all businesses, with 
                                               
* © 2019 Andrew A. Schwartz. Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. 
The research for Part III was undertaken while the author was a Fulbright Research Scholar 
in residence at the University of Auckland Law School. For discussion and comments on 
prior drafts, I thank Elisabeth de Fontenay, Martin Gelter, Mark Loewenstein, James Park, 
Allison Schwartz and Andrew Verstein, as well as those that participated in faculty 
workshops at UCLA Law School, Wake Forest University School of Law and the University 
of Colorado Law School. For research assistance, I thank Morgan Pullam and Savanna 
Griffis, and for editorial assistance, I thank Kelly Ilseng. For financial support, I thank the 
United States Department of State, the J. William Fulbright Foreign Scholarship Board, and 
Fulbright New Zealand. 
1 Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1467–
70, n.57 (2013) (“the process of going public costs millions of dollars”). 
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even billion-dollar private companies (so-called ‘unicorns’) expressly declining to 
go public, in part due to the high and rising costs of mandatory disclosure, leading 
some to question the wisdom of the practice.2 
At the same time, opposition to mandatory disclosure has come from a small 
but persistent group of legal scholars, including Roberta Romano and Paul 
Mahoney, who challenge mandatory disclosure on theoretical grounds.3 These 
scholars generally rely on law-and-economics ideas suggesting that market 
incentives should be enough to induce companies to voluntarily provide investors 
with an appropriate level of disclosure, rendering mandatory disclosure wasteful, or 
at least unnecessary. For one thing, corporate promoters wishing to sell securities 
for their full value have an incentive to provide fulsome disclosure about the 
business; else potential investors will offer only a pittance per share.4 For another, 
intermediaries such as stock exchanges, being repeat players who need to keep their 
customers (investors) for the long term, likewise have a financial interest in ensuring 
sufficient disclosure from companies.5 As these scholars have shown, there are 
powerful private incentives for voluntary disclosure in securities markets, presenting 
a powerful challenge to the necessity of mandatory disclosure. 
Rising to this challenge and responding on the very same law-and-economics 
terms as the skeptics, Professor John Coffee and many other scholars developed a 
sophisticated defense of mandatory disclosure that largely swept the field in the 
1980s and remains the conventional wisdom to this day.6 According to this modern 
                                               
2 A 2011 report approximated around 6,700 large corporations were being actively 
traded at the time, and were responsible for a great portion of economic activity in the United 
States. See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, PUBLICLY HELD CORPORATIONS: A LAWYER’S GUIDE 1 
(2011). That number has decreased significantly for both regular companies and unicorn 
billion dollar companies in recent years alongside falling IPO public offerings. See Eric 
Shumpeter, Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, ECONOMIST 
(Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/22/why-the-decline-in-the-
number-of-listed-american-firms-matters [https://perma.cc/VYB3-JALF]; Jason M. 
Thomas, Where Have All the Public Companies Gone?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2017, 7:10 
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/where-have-all-the-public-companies-gone-15108691 
25 [https://perma.cc/3CND-J3YT]; see also Andy Kessler, Unicorns Need IPOs, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 7, 2018, 4:37 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/unicorns-need-ipos-1515361043 
[https://perma.cc/K2PM-529D]. 
3 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2373–81 (1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as 
Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1465–70 (1997) (advocating a competitive regulatory 
approach to securities regulation). 
4 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 256 (1991). 
5 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459 (“Self-interested stock exchange members will 
produce rules that investors want for the same reasons that self-interested bakers produce the 
kind of bread that consumers want.”). 
6 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a 
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). 
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theory, mandatory disclosure is an efficient response to two economic issues that 
market forces would not properly address on their own: (1) agency costs, and (2) the 
underproduction of information.7 
“Agency costs” is the idea that, left to their own devices, corporate managers 
might pay themselves extravagantly, work as little as possible, or even steal from 
the company, all to the detriment of investors.8 Under a regime of voluntary 
disclosure, where managers of a corporation have free rein to decide what the 
company will and will not disclose, they might decide to keep quiet about things that 
paint them personally in a bad light, even if the information would be relevant to the 
value of the company’s securities. Mandatory disclosure can solve this problem by 
requiring companies to share information about managerial misbehavior even if it 
leads the stock price to fall. Mandatory disclosure also deters bad behavior in the 
first place, as managers can be expected to police their actions to avoid having to 
provide embarrassing disclosures later.9 
“Information underproduction” refers to the unlikelihood that companies will 
voluntarily collect and disclose information that could be relevant to the value of 
other firms, even if investors would prefer disclosure.10 To take but one example: 
McDonald’s, which sells lots of soft drinks, presumably has information relevant to 
consumer demand for Coke, including its rate of growth and how it compares with 
competitors like Dr. Pepper and apple juice. This information on consumer demand 
is useful and therefore valuable to Coca-Cola’s current and potential shareholders, 
who are constantly trying to gauge consumer demand for Coke as a component of 
their valuation of Coca-Cola stock. Unfortunately, McDonald’s has little financial 
interest in tallying and reporting its Coke sales because doing so imposes some cost 
on McDonald’s, but the benefit (of more accurate valuation) would flow to Coca-
Cola and the market as a whole. Mandatory disclosure can remedy this problem by 
                                               
7 Hence, they are sometimes called ‘market failures.’ 
8 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 9–10; ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & 
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932); 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
9 Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 463 (2003) (“The argument is that 
disclosure has a prophylactic effect by deterring corporate insiders from engaging in 
fraudulent or corrupt behavior or mismanagement . . . .”). See generally 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, 
PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY J. Bentham 396, 402 (John Bowring 
ed., 1962) (“When a man perceives or supposes pain to be the consequences of an act, he is 
acted upon in such a manner as tends, with a certain force, to withdraw him, as it were, from 
the commission of that act.”); A. A. Sommer, Jr., Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 
263, 266–67 (1976) (“[I]f every instance of adultery had to be disclosed, there would 
probably be less adultery.”). 
10 Coffee, supra note 6, at 721–23 (discussing securities research as having similar 
characteristics and problems that public goods have, the main example being 
undercollection.). 
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forcing all public companies to share certain types of information, thereby enhancing 
the accuracy of all securities prices on the public trading market.11 
Thanks to these two powerful ideas, the modern theory of mandatory disclosure 
has achieved hegemony in the field. Nearly all scholars support the idea, both in the 
United States and around the world.12 Only a very few academic “skeptics” continue 
to hold out in favor of voluntary disclosure.13 Almost entirely overlooked in the 
discussion, however, is the simple distinction between primary and secondary 
markets. Understanding how mandatory disclosure operates differently in these two 
markets provides potential ground for reconciliation among these competing 
scholarly camps.  
Secondary markets receive much more scholarly attention than do primary 
markets, despite their names.14 Scholars’ focus on secondary trading rather than 
primary offerings is understandable since many of the most important and 
interesting issues in the field of securities law arise in that sphere. These issues 
include insider trading, proxy contests, and hostile takeovers. When someone 
mentions “the stock market” or “how the market is doing,” she likely means to refer 
to the secondary market, not the primary one. Unfortunately, this focus on secondary 
markets has led to a significant misunderstanding at the heart of modern securities 
law and theory. This Article aims to correct that error. 
Focusing primarily on the aforementioned concepts of agency costs and 
information underproduction makes good sense in the context of secondary markets. 
But if the field shifts its gaze to the primary context, these two ideas become largely 
irrelevant, or so this Article shall claim.15 
                                               
11 For another example, traders in Apple stock try to estimate the company’s iPhone 
sales by reviewing disclosures made by other public companies that supply Apple with 
screens or other iPhone components. See, e.g., Tripp Mickle, Apple Shares Sink After iPhone 
Suppliers Lower Outlooks, WALL ST. J., (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
apple-shares-sink-after-iphone-suppliers-lower-outlooks-1542061197 [https://perma.cc/XV 
M8-PD4E] (“Apple Inc. shares sank [more than 5%] on Monday, as investors’ worries 
deepened about sales of new iPhones after two key suppliers for the device cut their earnings 
projections for coming months.”). 
12 See infra Section I.B. 
13 Brent J. Horton, In Defense of a Federally Mandated Disclosure System: Observing 
Pre-Securities Act Prospectuses, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 743, 745 (2017) (“[S]ome legal scholars 
have questioned the Congressional finding that corporations failed to provide investors with 
information; these scholars are referred to as ‘skeptics . . . .’”). 
14 Insider trading alone, just one of the many features of the secondary market, attracts 
more attention than IPOs, the key component of the primary market. To quantify this 
phenomenon, consider that a September 7, 2019, search of Westlaw’s “Secondary Sources - 
Law Reviews & Journals” database returned 563 law review articles with “insider trading” 
in the title, but only 130 with “IPO” or “initial public offering” in the title. 
15 See infra Part II. The canonical article in support of the modern theory hinted at 
precisely this argument. Coffee, supra note 6, at 746 (noting that, while “the theory of 
voluntary disclosure” was not persuasive with regard to “secondary market trading,” it “does 
seem to have some validity as applied to initial public offerings and, to a lesser extent, to all 
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As discussed in Part II below, neither agency costs nor information 
underproduction holds much relevance in the primary context. Agency costs arise 
only after a company has already sold its securities and investors worry that 
management will begin to run the company in its own interest, rather than for the 
benefit of shareholders. This concept is irrelevant to the primary market, where 
promoters are trying to get investors to buy these securities at the outset, and thus 
do not have additional shareholders to worry about just yet. In the primary market, 
the board of directors, CEO, and other managers have not yet become agents, 
because agency is established by the presence of shareholders. Because management 
has not yet become an agent, there are no agency costs; they are a feature of the 
secondary market alone. 
Information underproduction occurs when one company may have relatively 
easy access to information that would help participants in the secondary market more 
accurately assess the value of some other company or companies whose securities 
they trade. Information underproduction has almost nothing to do with primary 
offerings, because new issuers rarely have the same quantity or quality of relevant 
market information as existing public companies, and because a primary offering is 
merely a one-time event. Furthermore, promoters have powerful economic interests 
to divulge all the information that investors want. Thus, the public can likely view 
almost all relevant company information.16 
This Article poses a direct theoretical challenge to the dominant view that 
mandatory disclosure—and all its attendant costs—is justified in the context of 
primary offerings. Contradicting the guiding principle of the Securities Act of 1933, 
it suggests that primary offerings—especially those not followed by secondary 
trading—may not actually require mandatory disclosure at all. This Article’s novel 
distinction between primary and secondary markets thus provides theoretical 
support for a legal reform that would allow companies to make simple, low-cost 
primary offerings to the public. 
Indeed, this is not only a theoretical possibility but a real one—at least in New 
Zealand. This small country, whose economy, population, and landmass is roughly 
comparable to one of the several states17 and whose securities laws tend to mirror 
                                               
primary distributions”). 
16 That said, the concept of information underproduction (unlike agency costs) is not 
totally irrelevant in the primary context. It is possible that the information provided in a 
primary offering could help traders value other securities already quoted on the secondary 
market. For instance, certain initial disclosures provided by electric-car maker Tesla at the 
time of its IPO probably were relevant to traders trying to value other car companies like 
Ford or GM, whose stock was already traded in the secondary market. In most instances, 
however, information production is of little practical importance in the context of primary 
issuance. See discussion infra Section II.A.2, and accompanying notes 108–113. 
17 Colorado and New Zealand both have about five million residents, similar size 
economies, and almost the exact same land mass. QuickFacts Colorado, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CO [https://perma.cc/8GM3-UN5N] (last 
visited Sept. 18, 2019); CIA, The World Factbook Australia – Oceania: New Zealand, 
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our own,18 was one of the first in the world to establish a legal framework for “equity 
crowdfunding.”19 This new form of internet-based public stock market is solely a 
primary market with no secondary trading.20 This Article hypothesizes that a 
primary-only market such as this could succeed entirely based on voluntary 
disclosure. New Zealand put this claim to the test. 
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding law, passed in 2013 and put into effect the 
following year, took the seemingly radical step of eliminating mandatory 
disclosure.21 What to disclose is a voluntary decision made by the company issuing 
shares and the platform on which it lists its offering. By comparison, the 
crowdfunding law in the United States, enacted in 2012, is much more traditional 
because it imposes a set of specified mandatory disclosures.22 The United States has 
thus premised crowdfunding on the modern theory of mandatory disclosure (even 
though that theory does not fit a primary-only market). By contrast, crowdfunding 
                                               
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nz.html [https://perma.cc 
/3QWU-2H8B] (last updated Sept. 18, 2019). 
18 See Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gatekeepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 885, 917–18 (2018) [hereinafter Schwartz, Gatekeepers]. 
19 Id. at 919–21 (describing New Zealand’s Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013 and 
regulations issued thereunder). 
20 This is not due to a legal restriction but rather a business decision by New Zealand’s 
equity crowdfunding platforms not to organize a secondary market. See Sophie Boot, 
Investors Not Yet Ready for Secondary Market in Crowd-Funded Equities, Platforms Say, 
SCOOP (NZ) (July 12, 2017, 8:50 PM), http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1707/S00307/ 
correct-investors-not-yet-ready-for-secondary-market.htm [https://perma.cc/4GWW-
ARTN] (“Platforms with existing crowdfunding licences would need to apply to the FMA in 
order to operate a secondary market, but none have yet done so.”); Nikki Mandow, Snowball 
Effect Looks at Launching Secondary Market, SCOOP (NZ) (May 9, 2018, 4:16 PM), 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1805/S00282/snowball-effect-looks-at-launching-secon 
dary-market.htm [https://perma.cc/YHK6-FQZZ] (reporting that one platform is “looking at 
launching a secondary market,” but has yet to do so). One platform in the UK does operate 
a secondary market, but that appears to be the lone exception worldwide. Mandow, supra 
(“UK-based equity crowdfunding platform Seedrs launched a secondary market in June 
[2017]. Its model involves opening its market on the first Tuesday of every month and 
closing it a week later.”). 
21 Financial Markets Conduct Act 2013, sch 1, s 6(1)(a) (N.Z.) (“An offer of financial 
products to a person (A) does not require disclosure under Part 3 of this Act if the offer is 
through a licensed intermediary in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary services 
to (A).”); Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, s 184(a) (N.Z.) (defining equity 
crowdfunding as a “prescribed intermediary service . . . .”). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(b)(1)(A)-(I) (2012) (mandating various disclosures and 
authorizing the SEC to add to the list “such other information as the Commission may, by 
rule, prescribe, for the protection of investors and in the public interest . . .”); see also Joan 
MacLeod Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political 
Pressure, Hasty Decisions, and Inexpert Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. 
L.J. 865, 869 (2014) (“Congress employed traditional tools of securities regulation in 
composing the [JOBS] Act . . . ,” including “mandatory disclosure rules . . . .”). 
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in New Zealand is premised on this Article’s thesis that a primary-only securities 
market may not need mandatory disclosure. Instead, this market could thrive solely 
based on voluntary disclosure. So, how are these markets performing? 
This Article’s author spent six months on the ground in New Zealand to study 
the country’s crowdfunding law and marketplace. He conducted local qualitative 
research by interviewing entrepreneurs, platform operators, investors, lawyers, 
academics, and government officials (including the Minister of Commerce) about 
the subject. In addition, he conducted quantitative research by gathering publicly 
available data on equity crowdfunding in the United States, New Zealand, and other 
countries.23 
Using this research, this Article’s author provides an empirical report below 
that is consistent with the basic thesis of this Article. With the caveat that the United 
States is still in the early days and therefore should be cautious about drawing strong 
conclusions, New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market—a primary public stock 
market without mandatory disclosure—has indeed found financial success. 
Additionally, this market has greatly outshined that of the United States without any 
reported fraud. Scaled for the size of its economy and focusing on the first year in 
each jurisdiction, companies in New Zealand have conducted thirteen times as many 
crowdfunding campaigns and raised thirty times as much capital as their 
counterparts in the United States, with a much higher success rate (80% vs. 50%).24 
Furthermore, evidence from other jurisdictions shows that New Zealand has not only 
outshone the United States but has also become a worldwide leader in the field.25 
The outsized success of New Zealand’s liberal crowdfunding regime compared 
with that of the United States, along with the fact that fraud (or even business failure) 
is practically non-existent there, is consistent with this Article’s claim. To reiterate, 
this Article claims that a primary stock market open to the public does not need—
and in fact may be better off without—mandatory disclosure. Rather than 
government regulation, New Zealand’s crowdfunding market relies upon private 
methods of governance such as gatekeeping and syndication, both of which this 
Article describes below. 
The structure of this Article is as follows: Part I introduces the modern theory 
of mandatory disclosure and its foundations based on agency costs and information 
underproduction; Part II presents the Article’s core theoretical contribution and 




                                               
23 Other aspects of this research are reported and discussed in other papers. See, e.g., 
Andrew A. Schwartz, Social Enterprise Crowdfunding in New Zealand, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW (Joseph Yockey & Benjamin Means eds., 2018); 
Schwartz, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 885 (2018); Andrew A. Schwartz, Equity 
Crowdfunding in New Zealand, 2018 N.Z. L. REV. 243; [hereinafter Schwartz, Equity 
Crowdfunding in New Zealand]. 
24 Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, supra note 23, at 250–52. 
25 Id. at 253. 
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primary offerings, with the result that a primary market can succeed without 
mandatory disclosure; Part III presents empirical evidence from New Zealand’s 
equity crowdfunding market that is consistent with the claim. A short Conclusion 
summarizes the argument. 
 
II.  THE MODERN THEORY OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
 
At least since the New Deal of the 1930s, the overwhelming consensus in the 
field of securities law has been that public securities markets (like the New York 
Stock Exchange) cannot regulate themselves.26 Rather, because of their importance 
and potential danger, scholars generally agree that public securities markets must be 
carefully and comprehensively regulated.27 This regulation is accomplished 
primarily through mandatory disclosure, both for primary offerings made to the 
public and for secondary trading markets open to the public.28 
Mandatory disclosure imposes such significant costs that it deters many 
companies, especially small ones, from conducting an IPO in the first place.29 Even 
so, nearly all scholars and policymakers support the policy based on what this Article 
refers to as the modern theory of mandatory disclosure.30 This modern theory holds 
that economic forces will be insufficient to generate an optimal level of disclosure 
for public investors because of two market failures: agency costs and information 
underproduction. Thus, this modern theory posits that the law can solve these 
problems through mandatory disclosure.31 
  
                                               
26 STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, ESSENTIALS: SECURITIES REGULATION 1 (2008) 
(“Generally, in a market economy, people are left to their own devices when deciding how 
to allocate their funds. If you want to use your money to buy a vacation or a fancy new car, 
the legal system will not stand in your way. . . . For securities, however, a dedicated federal 
agency, [the] SEC, enforces a broad array of federal statutes and regulations.”). 
27 Id. at 4. 
28 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1465 (“The most prominent feature of securities regulation 
in the United States is the mandatory disclosure system.”). 
29 See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531, 
546 (2012) (“Representatives of smaller companies have complained repeatedly to Congress 
and the SEC about escalating costs and surveys indicate that compliance obligations are 
among the biggest concerns entrepreneurial firms have with going public. While it seems 
that companies gripe about the costs of compliance no matter the regulatory regime, in this 
case the concerns appear credible.”). 
30 Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for Corporate 
Disclosure, 35 YALE J. REG. 383, 390 (2018) (“The consensus story in the securities-law 
literature is that market forces alone are insufficient to bring about sufficient amounts of 
public-company disclosure.”). 
31 Id. at 383 (“It has long been said that market forces alone will result in a problematic 
under-sharing of information by public companies.”). 
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A.  Mandatory Disclosure and Its Costs 
 
Centuries ago, stock markets were small, private clubs where the members 
knew and dealt with one another on a regular and repeated basis.32 The members 
also had a clear economic incentive to protect investors, since their livelihoods 
depended on their clients coming back to trade again in the future (and they would 
only do so if they felt they were treated fairly).33 An entrepreneur seeking to finance 
a venture was a one-time player and in a position to mislead investors and then take 
the money and run. Yet the members of the exchange, as repeat players, were not 
willing to sacrifice the trust which investors placed in them. Under such conditions, 
club members came together and established a set of private rules, as well as private 
methods of enforcement (such as stripping violators of their membership), that 
proved fairly effective at preventing fraud and market abuse by entrepreneurs and 
other one-time players.34 Legal regulation of securities was apparently not needed.35 
By the twentieth century, however, things had changed. Stock exchanges were 
opened up to the public, and millions of ordinary Americans bought and sold stock 
through brokers at the New York Stock Exchange and similar venues, making self-
                                               
32 EDWARD PETER STRINGHAM, PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: CREATING ORDER IN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE 21–26 (2015) (discussing the theory of ‘club goods’); id. at 3 
(“Without the ability to rely on external courts, [stock] brokers transformed coffeehouses 
into private clubs that created and enforced rules. Each club aimed to admit only reputable 
brokers, and those who broke the rules would be kicked out and labelled a ‘lame duck.’ The 
private club known as Jonathan’s Coffeehouse eventually became the London Stock 
Exchange . . . .”). 
33 Id. at 72 (“Fraud harms victims and diminishes future trade. London stockbrokers 
saw this problem and recognized that they could benefit by mitigating it.”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 
VA. L. REV. 669, 690 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Protection of Investors] 
(“Exchanges gain . . . by adopting rules that minimize the amount of deceit committed by 
listed firms, because investors who are misled are less likely to be repeat players.”); 
Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1457 (“Exchanges should have strong incentives to adopt rules 
that benefit investors. I will not belabour the arguments because they are the same ones that 
apply to the incentives of any producer to supply goods or services that consumers 
desire . . . .”). 
34 STRINGHAM, supra note 32, at 61–76; cf. Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual 
Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 764, 798–99 (2012) (explaining that when parties 
anticipate repeated future interactions, “the optimal move is always to cooperate” and 
discussing the ‘prisoners dilemma’) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
35 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1457 (“Stock markets, meaning organized markets in 
which professional, specialized intermediaries trade securities pursuant to a common set of 
rules, have existed since the seventeenth century. Governments paid attention to, and tried 
to restrict the activities of, these markets from the outset, but for most exchanges, 
comprehensive governmental regulation of rules and procedures is a twentieth-century 
phenomenon. For most of their history, then, exchanges have been the primary regulators of 
securities markets.”). 
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regulation infeasible.36 With stock trading now open to the public, the state and then 
federal governments began to impose mandatory regulations on the practice to 
protect investors. This imposition began in the 1910s when numerous state 
governments, led by Kansas and other states far from Wall Street, passed so-called 
“Blue Sky” laws.37 These statutes required that sellers of securities file their 
securities with state authorities and have them approved prior to making any offers 
to state residents, thereby requiring state government regulators to provide a 
substantive “merit” review of every security for sale in the state. These merit reviews 
not only revealed information about the company but also determined whether the 
offering was fair for the buyer. 
A few decades later—shortly after the devastating stock market crash of 1929 
and amid of the Great Depression—the federal government enacted the Securities 
Act of 1933 (the ‘Securities Act’) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.38 These 
sweeping statutes gave birth to the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and 
imposed intense regulation and oversight on public securities markets.39 The core 
feature of this federal regulatory regime was, and remains, mandatory disclosure. 
This feature represents a legal requirement that companies selling stock or other 
securities provide specified information to the SEC and the public.40 In contrast with 
the Blue Sky laws, the federal system of mandatory disclosure did not call for merit 
review.41 Rather, the goal was simply to give investors the relevant information 
about a company and let them make their own decision whether to invest.42 
  
                                               
36 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE, HISTORICAL 
TIMELINE, https://www.nyse.com/publicdocs/American_Stock_Exchange_Historical_Time 
line.pdf [https://perma.cc/QW68-H4L3]. 
37 See generally Rick A. Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a 
Foundation Laid in the Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583 (2011). 
38 LOUIS LOSS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 47–65 (7th ed. 
2018) (recounting the history and purpose of the Acts). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 50–54; Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the 
Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. CORP. L. 725, 726 (2014) (opining that mandatory disclosure 
is the “crown jewel and major innovation” of federal securities regulation.); Allen Ferrell, 
Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market, 36 
J. LEGAL STUD. 213 (2007) (“Mandatory disclosure requirements placed on publicly traded 
firms constitute the core of U.S. securities regulation.”); Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1465 
(“The most prominent feature of securities regulation in the United States is the mandatory 
disclosure system.”). 
41 LOSS ET AL., supra note 38, at 50–53 (describing the “battle of the philosophies”—
merit review versus mandatory disclosure—and noting that, in the end, “President Roosevelt 
chose the disclosure philosophy.”). 
42 It is certainly true that many “ordinary” investors lack the time and expertise to 
actually read and understand securities disclosures. Even so, they can rely on summaries and 
reports from ‘Wall Street’ analysts who essentially translate the specialized language used 
in securities filings into plain English. 
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Under the Securities Act, a company seeking to sell securities to the public in 
a primary offering (often called an Initial Public Offering (IPO)) must first ‘register’ 
those securities with the SEC.43 This registration process includes filing a massive 
disclosure statement with the SEC that details information such as bonus and profit-
sharing agreements and financial statements from prior years.44 
All this work can consume over 1,200 hours45 and can take over six months to 
complete, even “under ideal conditions.”46 In addition to the direct cost of preparing 
this statement, companies incur the cost of distracted executives.47 Moreover, 
companies are usually unable to fulfill these disclosure requirements entirely on 
their own. This inability forces companies to add the expense of external attorneys, 
accountants, and underwriters.48 Generally, these additions add around 10% of the 
total offering amount to the price tag of an IPO.49 Then, after companies prepare a 
registration statement, they must wait for the SEC to review and comment on the 
statement draft. Because this process can take months, the price at which a company 
anticipated issuing its securities may have changed due to fluctuating financial or 
economic conditions, adding even more cost to the process.50  
Unfortunately, these burdens tend to fall most heavily on the companies who 
can afford them the least—small businesses with small offerings—because the costs 
of filing are not proportionate to the size of the offering.51 As the costs of providing 
disclosure reach millions of dollars, disclosure becomes totally infeasible for 
startups and small businesses who have less capital to spend. Thus, the pragmatic 
response for some small companies is to seek an exemption from the registration 
requirements altogether.52  
As the demands of mandatory disclosure have increased in recent years, in part 
because of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley53 and Dodd-Frank Acts,54 the United States 
                                               
43 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012); LOSS ET AL., supra note 38, at 62. 
44 See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) (providing instructions for filing registration statement). 
45 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1469. 
46 Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing 
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 8 (2007). 
47 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1469. 
48 Cohn & Yadley, supra note 46, at 9. 
49 Id. at 8 (“While a self-underwritten offering will cost less and, theoretically, can be 
completed in less time, results have not been positive for many non-underwritten 
offerings.”). 
50 Id. at 8. 
51 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1470. 
52 See generally Cohn & Yadley, supra note 46, at 12 (noting the numerous hurdles to 
qualifying for an exemption, including the fact that “[t]he private offering exemptions, 
Section 4(2) and Rule 506, impose ‘sophistication’ and ‘experience’ eligibility standards that 
substantially limit a small company’s pool of potential investors”). 
53 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in 
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.). 
54 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 12 
 
1080 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
has seen a sharp decline in IPOs: an average of over 300 IPOs per year between 1996 
and 2006. Since then, the country has seen an average of about 125 per year.55 
Because companies tend to hire most after they go public,56 this decline impacts not 
only the investing public, but also the working public. Though unfortunate in and of 
itself, this decline also has ramifications for the broader U.S. economy. As the 
American primary markets become less attractive to U.S. companies, they may 
choose to take their IPOs elsewhere, looking instead to markets in the United 
Kingdom or China.57 
Despite these concerns, this basic framework of federal securities regulation, 
with its focus on costly mandatory disclosure, has remained in place for nearly a 
century.58 During that time, the federal government has repeatedly demonstrated its 
continued faith in mandatory disclosure by expanding its scope and coverage.59 The 
result is that the cost of providing all the mandatory disclosures in an IPO can run to 
several million dollars.60 Despite this great expense, modern securities practitioners, 
regulators, and scholars overwhelmingly agree that mandatory disclosures are worth 
the cost.61 This broad consensus is premised on what this Article refers to as the 
                                               
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.). 
55 See 2017 IPO Report, WILMERHALE 2 (2017), https://www.wilmerhale.com/-
/media/fc4be2dd82d04a42ad7807f5e024d304.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DE5-URRM]. 
56 H.R. REP. NO. 112-406, at 7 (2012). 
57 Id. It bears noting that 2019 may herald a new wave of significant IPO activity. See 
Maureen Farrell & Corrie Driebusch, IPO-Hungry Investors Look to Have Their Moment in 
2019, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-hungry-investors-
look-to-have-their-moment-in-2019-11546189200 [https://perma.cc/3FU2-V6TD]. 
58 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for 
Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
749, 752 (2007). 
59 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 38, at 7–11 (describing “the recurrent theme” of federal 
securities legislation as “disclosure, again disclosure, and still more disclosure”). 
60 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1464. 
61 See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of 
the Public Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 473 (2017) (“For several decades now the 
majority view has been that, in theory, the cost-benefit analysis of mandatory disclosure in 
federal securities regulation is a favorable one . . . .”) [hereinafter de Fontenay, Deregulation 
of Private Capital]; see also de Fontenay, supra note 40, at 759 (2014) (referring to “the 
orthodoxy of mandatory disclosure . . . ”); Li-Wen Lin, Corporate Social and Environmental 
Disclosure in Emerging Securities Markets, 35 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2 (2009) 
(stating “disclosure is the orthodox focus of securities law”); Donald C. Langevoort, The 
SEC as a Lawmaker: Choices About Investor Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 84 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1591, 1617–18 (2006) (stating “orthodox securities regulation rests [on 
the idea] that investors take advantage of the disclosures that SEC requirements generate”); 
Robert Prentice, Whither Securities Regulation? Some Behavioral Observations Regarding 
Proposals for Its Future, 51 DUKE L.J. 1397, 1400 (2002) (discussing “the developing 
consensus that American securities regulation is the optimal system for governing capital 
markets”); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice 
Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1999) (reporting on a “rough 
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“modern theory” of mandatory disclosure, the substance of which shall be examined 
in the next Section. 
 
B.  Debate over Disclosure and the Two Theoretical Bases for the Modern Theory 
 
Scholars in the field widely agree that company disclosure provides numerous 
important benefits for investors, other companies, and the public at large,62 but 
disagree whether this disclosure should be mandated, or whether it can be 
accomplished voluntarily. Though the modern theory of mandatory disclosure still 
prevails, several compelling arguments for voluntary disclosure have been made. 
In the 1930s, when the federal securities laws were new, the driving rationale 
for mandatory disclosure was to treat “mom and pop” investors fairly by providing 
them with accurate and timely information about potential and actual investments.63 
But anyone who has actually looked at a securities filing in the primary market 
knows that these filings are so arcane and densely written as to be almost completely 
impenetrable to an ordinary retail investor. Rather, retail investors benefit from 
professional securities analysts who actually do read and trade based on such filings, 
and thereby drive market prices to incorporate the information contained in the 
                                               
consensus” in favor of mandatory disclosure and noting that “even most economics-oriented 
legal academics” agree); id. at 1340 (discussing the “prevailing consensus for retaining 
mandatory disclosure”). 
62 See de Fontenay, supra note 40, at 733–34 (cataloging the “possible benefits” of 
securities regulation as “preventing unsophisticated investors from making risky 
investments, ensuring that investors are adequately informed before making risky 
investments, improving the allocational efficiency of capital markets, preventing fraud by 
issuers and intermediaries, correcting inefficiencies in the production of material investment 
information, standardizing disclosure practices among issuers, controlling specific 
managerial or promoter agency problems, and helping established firms create barriers to 
entry for new firms”) (citations omitted); see also Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a 
Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983) (“Historically, the 
proponents of the SEC’s mandatory corporate disclosure system have advanced five 
principal arguments to justify the system. First, in the absence of a compulsory corporate 
disclosure system some issuers will conceal or misrepresent information material to 
investment decisions. Second, in the absence of a compulsory corporate disclosure system, 
underwriting costs and insiders’ salaries and perquisites will be excessive. Third, in the 
absence of a mandatory corporate disclosure system, there will be less ‘public confidence’ 
in the markets. Fourth, in the absence of the laws creating a mandatory corporate disclosure 
system, neither state laws nor private associations such as the New York Stock Exchange 
can ensure the optimal level of corporate disclosure. Fifth, in the absence of a mandatory 
corporate disclosure system, civil or criminal actions will not ensure optimal levels of 
corporate disclosure.”). 
63 de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, at 474 (“A moment’s 
thought makes it clear that passive, dispersed investors require substantial amounts of 
information from issuers in order to have any hope of valuing their investment . . . .”). 
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filing.64 Hence, over time, the “fairness rationale” for mandatory disclosure has been 
“almost universally discarded” among scholars and policymakers.65 
Similarly, no one seriously argues that large public companies would decline 
to provide information to the public absent legally mandated disclosure.66 This lack 
of argument is generally based on the concept of “signaling,” which suggests that 
companies have an incentive to disclose even bad news. This incentive exists 
because, if companies stay silent, investors will presume that things are even worse. 
Accordingly, a company seeking to raise money from the public has a clear 
economic incentive to disclose all information relevant to potential investors, 
regardless of whether such disclosure is mandated by law.67 Potential investors will 
presume a company that discloses nothing has something to hide (such as poor 
business performance). Thus, a company that is doing well (or even just fine) has an 
incentive to voluntarily disclose relevant information to distinguish itself from those 
poor prospects that remain silent.68 
                                               
64 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 293–94. 
65 Luca Enriques & Sergio Gilotta, Disclosure and Financial Market Regulation, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 514 (Niamh Moloney, et al., eds. 
2015) (“The fairness rationale has been almost universally discarded. Today, nobody 
seriously argues that protecting investors via disclosure is a proper policy just because doing 
so is . . . just.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, Protection of Investors, supra note 33, at 692–93 
(“The justification most commonly offered for mandatory disclosure rules is that they are 
necessary to ‘preserve confidence’ in the capital markets. It is said that investors, especially 
small and unsophisticated ones, withdraw their capital to the detriment of the markets and 
the economy as a whole when they fear that they may be exploited by the firms or better-
informed traders. Disclosure rules both deter fraud and equalize ‘access’ to information, 
restoring the necessary confidence. . . . [This argument is not persuasive;] after fifty years, 
the proponents of regulation have no scientifically-acceptable evidence of a favorable cost-
benefit ratio for any disclosure rule that rests on the benefits of reducing fraud or increasing 
confidence.”). 
66 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288 (“Firms have been disclosing 
important facts about themselves . . . as long as there have been firms.”). 
67 See Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications of 
Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177, 
184–85 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979) (“[I]n a competitive market (with no mandated 
disclosure) the managers of firms . . . will have a strong self-interest in disclosing relevant 
information.”). 
68 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–89; Easterbrook & Fischel, 
Protection of Investors, supra note 33, at 683 (“[T]ake a simple example of a firm that wants 
to issue new securities. The firm has a project (say, the manufacture of a new computer) that 
it expects to be profitable. If the firm simply asked for money without disclosing the project 
and managers involved, however, it would get nothing. Investors would assume the worst, 
because, they would reason that if the firm had anything good to say for itself it would do 
so. Silence means bad news. A firm with a good project, seeking to distinguish itself from a 
firm with a mediocre project (or no project at all), would disclose the optimal amount of 
information. That is, it would disclose more and more so long as the cost of disclosure (both 
direct costs of dissemination and indirect costs of giving information to rivals) was 
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As Easterbrook and Fischel, among others, have explained, disclosure is so 
valuable to both the public and public companies that law need not command it.69 
Therefore, we should expect it to come voluntarily. The upshot of this “voluntary 
disclosure” theory is that any sort of mandated disclosure that goes beyond what 
companies would voluntarily provide would be superfluous and wasteful.70 
Beyond the company itself, a private stock exchange likewise has powerful 
economic incentives to regulate its securities market in a way that will protect and 
benefit investors, a point championed by John Mahoney.71 The way that an exchange 
makes money is by listing companies and having investors buy in or trade with one 
another, as each transaction generates a return for the exchange.72 Since revenues 
rise as the volume of transaction rises, an exchange has a financial incentive to attract 
investors. As a result, exchanges have an interest in ensuring that investors feel well-
protected and sufficiently informed when they trade on the exchange.73 Under this 
theory, it would harm investors for the government to impose any additional 
disclosure obligations, because they cost more to produce and disseminate than they 
are worth to investors.74 
Additionally, an exchange could impose strict listing standards to protect 
investors, rather than listing any company that asks. An exchange could also 
discipline brokers who take advantage of investors by expelling them from the 
exchange (and thus impacting their livelihood).75 And even if individual companies 
                                               
worthwhile to investors as a whole.”); Romano, supra note 3, at 2374 (“Because firms need 
capital and investors need information, firms have powerful incentives to disclose 
information if they are to compete successfully for funds against alternative investment 
opportunities.”). 
69 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–89 (“If disclosure is worthwhile to 
investors, the firm can profit by providing it. . . . [For this reason, [f]irms have been disclosing 
important facts about themselves . . . as long as there have been firms.”). 
70 de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, at 476 (“In this view, 
mandating disclosure either leads to a surfeit of information that investors do not actually 
want—with heavy costs on the companies that generate it—or stifles innovation and 
improvements in disclosure.”); Seligman, supra note 62, at 5 n.24 (“In theory, it can be 
argued that a mandatory corporate disclosure system is unnecessary because corporate 
managers possess sufficient incentives to voluntarily disclose all or virtually all information 
material to investors.”). 
71 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1453. 
72 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“[T]he success of an exchange 
depends on the amount of trading.”). 
73 Id. (“[E]xchanges have incentives to adopt rules governing trade that operate to the 
benefit of investors.”); Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459 (“Self-interested stock exchange 
members will produce rules that investors want for the same reasons that self-interested 
bakers produce the kind of bread that consumers want.”). 
74 STRINGHAM, supra note 32, at 195–200; Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1500 
(“Exchanges have strong incentives to provide rules of market structure that investors want 
and to compel adherence by their members to contractual and fiduciary obligations.”). 
75 STRINGHAM, supra note 32, at 30–33. 
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face a collective action problem that would prevent them from providing efficient 
levels of disclosure, an exchange can solve that problem by requiring all listed 
companies to make certain specified disclosures.76 Indeed, stock exchanges 
performed all of these functions from the 1600s to the present day.77 Moreover, 
given their economic incentives and deep knowledge of market conditions, 
exchanges may do a better job regulating securities markets than government 
officials.78 Similar arguments could apply to professional underwriters and 
investment banks, as well as any other intermediaries that bridge the divide between 
companies and the public. 
Based on these theories, a few dissenters have challenged the modern theory in 
support of mandatory disclosure and spoken out in favor of voluntary disclosure. 
Among the most notable of these dissenters are Professors Roberta Romano, Paul 
Mahoney, Alan Palmiter, Stephen Choi, and Andrew Guzman. All of these 
professors have published articles questioning the soundness of the arguments in 
favor of mandatory disclosure and other aspects of modern securities regulation.79 
Even so, the consensus in favor of mandatory disclosure remains as strong as 
ever. This strength is unrelated to any empirical findings in support of mandatory 
disclosure, as the empirical evidence, although voluminous, is ultimately 
inconclusive.80 Rather, modern scholars’ support for legally mandated disclosure 
                                               
76 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 294–95 (“Organized exchanges offer the 
firms a way to cope with the collective action problem.”). 
77 See generally STRINGHAM, supra note 32; see also Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1459–
62; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 2 (section on “Disclosure 
and Reporting Material Information”). 
78 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1462 (“[A] governmental regulator that sets out to 
determine optimal exchange rules starts from a substantial disadvantage in information, 
experience, and incentives compared to an exchange.”). 
79 See generally Romano, supra note 3, at 2359; Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, 
Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998). 
80 Fox, supra note 61, at 1394 (stating that “empirical studies have not resolved the 
issue one way or the other . . .”). Some empirical studies suggest that companies would 
voluntarily disclose all the information the market would want without legal compulsion. 
See, e.g., de Fontenay, supra note 40, at 728–29 (detailing empirical study concluding that 
“the securities laws are not achieving their principal goal” of “remedying the 
underproduction of material investment information” in “today’s debt markets” because, 
“[p]urely through private ordering, the loan market appears to be providing sufficient 
information for investors . . .”); Romano, supra note 3, at 2373; George J. Benston, Required 
Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 
AM. ECON. REV. 132, 144–45 (1973) (empirical analysis of stock prices before and after the 
passage of the 1930s federal securities laws finding no significant effect from the new 
mandated disclosure—suggesting that companies were already voluntarily providing all the 
information that the market desired). Other empirical studies lend support to the consensus 
view that mandatory disclosure is needed, beneficial and efficient. See, e.g., REINIER 
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
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rests primarily on theory. Specifically, this theory includes two ideas that sound in 
law-and-economics: (1) opportunism resulting in agency costs, and (2) inaccurate 
pricing caused by information underproduction.81 
 
1.  Agency Costs 
 
First, the separation of ownership and control that is so essential to the corporate 
form82 also creates agency costs and the risk of opportunistic behavior by corporate 
management.83 The idea here, at its most basic, is that those who manage a 
                                               
APPROACH 279 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter KRAAKMAN (2009)] (acknowledging that “early” 
empirical studies found otherwise, but contending that recent empirical studies support the 
orthodox consensus in favor of mandatory disclosure); Prentice, supra note 61, at 1495–99 
(presenting empirical findings to show that “American-style securities regulation [is] the 
optimal approach to producing efficient securities markets”); Fox, supra note 61, at 1393 
(“There is affirmative evidence for the proposition that mandatory disclosure has increased 
the amount of meaningful information in the market and has improved price accuracy.”). In 
the end, the empirical data is inconclusive. Fox, supra note 61, at 1394; REINIER KRAAKMAN 
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
204 (1st ed. 2004) [hereinafter KRAAKMAN (2004)] (“[B]oth supporters and critics of the 
U.S. mandatory disclosure legislation . . . acknowledge that empirical studies can neither 
demonstrate that their benefits outweigh their costs, nor show the converse.”). 
81 REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 246 (3d ed. 2017) [hereinafter KRAAKMAN (2017)] (“The case 
for mandatory disclosure [is premised on the concern] that firms will not disclose sufficient, 
or sufficiently comparable, information without it.”); Enriques & Gilotta, supra note 65, at 
514 (“Today, nobody seriously argues that protecting investors via disclosure is a proper 
policy just because doing so is . . . just. Many, instead, and especially policymakers, contend 
that protecting investors is instrumental to the well-functioning—if not to the very 
existence—of the market and has thus an efficiency justification.”); Merritt B. Fox, 
Rethinking Disclosure Liability in the Modern Era, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 903, 915 (1997) 
(“[T]he function of mandatory disclosure is efficiency—improved selection of the proposed 
new investment projects in the economy and improved operation of existing ones—not 
investor protection.”). A third, weaker, theory for mandatory disclosure is based on “the 
value of standardization” which improves comparability between firms. But this can be 
achieved through private standard-setting bodies, like the NYSE. KRAAKMAN (2017), supra 
note 81, at 246 (making the modest claim that “mandatory disclosure may accelerate the 
standardization process”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4. 
82 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (2019) (providing that the board of directors 
shall manage the corporation). 
83 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 217 (“Once they are ensconced, and have 
raised the capital the firm needs, managers may elect to behave opportunistically—to 
maintain themselves in office or raise their compensation at the expense of investors.”); 
KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 245–58; EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, 9–
10; Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336–38 (1979); Zohar Goshen & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 718 (2006). 
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corporation (CEO, etc.) have different incentives than the shareholders.84 In 
particular, corporate management would surely be disinclined to share certain types 
of news with investors lest they get demoted or terminated, especially items that put 
them personally in a bad light.85 Furthermore, shareholders might be glad to go along 
with minimal disclosure of bad news, since the value of their holdings would go 
down upon release.86 This is an unfortunate reality, as this kind of information would 
be socially useful for the world to know so the market price for a stock can reflect 
its true value based on all accurate information.87 Mandatory disclosure offers one 
solution to the fundamental agency problem of the corporate form by mandating that 
this information becomes publicly available.88 
 
2.  Information Underproduction 
 
Second, there is the theoretical claim that “mandatory disclosure [helps] market 
participants to determine prices for securities that accurately reflect all available 
information,” thereby enhancing social welfare.89 Disclosure must be mandated 
because it might not be forthcoming voluntarily, such as when “the private benefits 
of disclosure to issuers may be less than its social benefits to market participants.”90 
The idea is that left to their own devices, companies might not provide as much 
disclosure as diversified investors would like, due to collective-action problems.91  
 
 
                                               
84 See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 9–10; BERLE & MEANS, supra 
note 8, at 6; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 8, at 308; KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 
246. 
85 KRAAKMAN (2004), supra note 80, at 246; cf., e.g., Thomas Gryta et al., GE Board 
in Dark on CEO’s Use of Extra Jet, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2017, at B1 (“General Electric Co. 
executives didn’t notify the company’s board until this month about its regular flying of a 
spare business jet for its chief executive . . . . While CEO, Mr. Immelt wanted a backup jet 
in case there was a mechanical issue that could lead to delays . . . . Flight crews were told to 
not openly refer to the backup planes, for fear of raising eyebrows . . . . One person said the 
flight manifest sometimes listed ‘Robert Jeffries’ or ‘Jeffrey Roberts’ as the passenger on 
the second plane, when in fact the seats were empty.”). 
86 KRAAKMAN (2004), supra note 80, at 278.  
87 KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 246–48.  
88 Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (contending that “the principal purpose of mandatory 
disclosure is to address certain agency problems . . .”). 
89 Id. at 1048. 
90 KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 246; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra 
note 4, 290–91; Easterbrook & Fischel, Protection of Investors, supra note 33, at 673–80. 
91 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 290–91 (“The information produced by 
one firm for its investors may be valuable to investors of other firms . . . . Yet firm A cannot 
charge the investors in these other firms for the benefits, although they would be willing to 
pay for them. Because they cannot be charged, the information will be underproduced.”). 
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For example, a company might rationally decide not to disclose a certain piece of 
information, even if investors would want to know it because doing so would aid a 
competitor.92 
These two justifications for mandatory disclosure—agency costs and 
underproduction of information—have sound theoretical bases and have proved 
persuasive to the current generation of securities law scholars and policymakers.93 
The overwhelming consensus in the field remains that mandatory disclosure is both 
beneficial and efficient, and should remain as the essential component of securities 
regulation both in the United States and abroad.94 A substantial majority of securities 
law scholars—including Professors John Coffee, Merritt Fox, Alan Ferrell, Reiner 
Kraakman, Robert Prentice, and Michael Guttentag—practitioners, and regulators 
all support the modern theory in favor of mandatory disclosure.95  
 
III. THE MODERN THEORY DOES NOT APPLY TO PRIMARY OFFERINGS 
 
The previous Part described the powerful and popular modern theory in favor 
of mandatory disclosure in public stock markets. Yet, for all its strength and all its 
adherents, that consensus ultimately rests on just two theoretical justifications—(1) 
agency costs, and (2) information underproduction. And while these two theories 
apply quite obviously and directly to a secondary market (where investors trade 
securities with one another), they have only a limited relationship with the primary 
market (where companies issue securities to investors), as this Part establishes. The 
upshot is that the modern theory should be conceptually limited in application to 
                                               
92 KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 246–48. 
93 de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, at 477 (“[T]he 
contemporary case for imposing disclosure requirements on firms rests primarily on 
collective action problems and agency costs that disincentivize voluntary corporate 
disclosure.”). 
94 KRAAKMAN (2004), supra note 80, at 204 (“Despite academic criticism, however, the 
majority view among both scholars and regulators is that public companies would 
underproduce information in the absence of mandatory disclosure.”); Fox, supra note 61, at 
1339–40, 1339 n.13 (identifying only a handful of “prominent dissenter[s]” from the 
consensus view). This is true not only in the United States but around the world. See Allen 
Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the World, 2 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 125 (2007) (“[T]he case for mandatory disclosure is 
strong for virtually all countries around the world.”); Prentice, supra note 61, at 1495 
(discussing the “developing global consensus favoring American-style securities regulation 
as the optimal approach to producing efficient securities markets”). 
95 KRAAKMAN (2009), supra note 80, at 279 (Although “legal scholars continue to 
debate how far issuers should be given discretion over disclosure in public markets[, i]n our 
view recent scholarship supports the conventional view that publicly-traded firms under-
report information without legal compulsion.”). Even the authors of an article called The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure accept that mandatory disclosure is appropriate for the 
securities context. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 732 (2011). 
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secondary markets. A further lesson is that scholars ought to seriously entertain the 
possibility that mandatory disclosure may not be required, or even helpful, for 
primary offerings. 
 
A.  The Two Theoretical Bases of the Modern Theory Are Addressed to Secondary 
Markets, not Primary Offerings 
 
Recall that there are powerful economic incentives for corporate insiders and 
promoters to voluntarily provide full and fair disclosure to potential investors in a 
primary offering.96 This is a function both of the signaling theory discussed above97 
and the long-term interest of the exchange, which hopes to entice investors to return 
to buy into future offerings.98 Nevertheless, as this Article showed in Part I, this 
theory of voluntary disclosure has largely been overcome by two powerful law-and-
economics concepts that undermine it: (1) agency costs, and (2) information 
underproduction.99  
These concepts, however, pertain almost entirely to the secondary market and 
are largely inapplicable in the context of primary offerings, as this Section will 
explain.100 Agency costs are irrelevant to primary offerings, simply because there 
can be no agents until there are shareholders.101 And while information 
underproduction is not totally irrelevant in the context of primary offerings, it holds 
little force as a practical matter.102 
  
                                               
96 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–90; Seligman, supra note 62, at 61 
(“In theory, it can be argued that a mandatory corporate disclosure system is unnecessary 
because corporate managers possess sufficient incentives to voluntarily disclose all or 
virtually all information material to investors. These incentives are strongest with respect to 
new issues.”) (emphasis added). 
97 See supra Section II.B; see, e.g., de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra 
note 61, at 475 (stating “issuers therefore face powerful market incentives to disclose 
precisely the amount and type of information that potential investors desire”). 
98 Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1465–70. 
99 Supra Section I.B.1-2; de Fontenay, Deregulation of Private Capital, supra note 61, 
at 477–78. 
100 Cf. KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 247–52 (explaining how the value of 
mandatory disclosure on the secondary market can have a knock-on benefit for the primary 
market). 
101 Infra Section II.A.1. 
102 Id. 
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1.  Agency Costs 
 
Agency costs refer to misbehavior by the board of directors, CEO, and other 
managers (agents) of a public company whose shares are already widely dispersed. 
Agency costs are purely a function of a secondary market where public investors 
have already paid over their capital and must hope that the management will work 
diligently for the corporate interest.103 
As Easterbrook and Fischel explain, “[o]nce they are ensconced, and have 
raised the capital the firm needs,” managers have the chance to behave 
opportunistically and take advantage of the investors.104 But this can only happen 
once they are ensconced. In other words, it is only after a primary offering occurs 
that managers have the power to oppress the investors whose capital they (now) 
control. Before that moment, agency costs are physically impossible. Outsiders have 
not yet handed over their money. Therefore, there are no principals and no agents 
(yet).105 In short, the concept of agency costs has no logical application in the context 
of primary markets. 
 
2.  Information Underproduction 
 
Information underproduction is based on the idea that information is a valuable 
public good because it enhances the accuracy of the prices at which securities trade 
on the secondary market. Recall the example where McDonald’s has access to 
information relevant to the valuation of Coca-Cola. The secondary market benefits 
from the disclosure of such information because this information would allow 
traders to better estimate the value of Coca-Cola. However, actually obtaining this 
information is costly and the actor holding the information (McDonald’s) would not 
capture the full benefits of disclosure if they released the information, leading to the 
concern that it will not be disclosed. The issue, importantly, is much bigger than 
Coke and McDonald’s. Many, perhaps all, companies have access to information 
that they do or could collect that would help traders value other companies. In the 
absence of compulsion, none of the companies would collect and disclose this 
information, leaving them all worse off than they could have been if they all 
cooperated. Mandatory disclosure can remedy this problem, and thereby benefit 
participants in the secondary markets. 
Note that this issue of information underproduction is entirely about the 
secondary market. Mandatory disclosure can induce cooperation among issuers so 
                                               
103 Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1416, 1419 (1989) (“Managers and investors . . . assume their roles with knowledge 
of the consequences. Investors part with their money willingly, putting dollars in equities 
instead of bonds or banks or land or gold because they believe the returns of equities more 
attractive. Managers obtain their positions after much trouble and toil, competing against 
others who wanted them . . . . They must attract . . . investors by promising and delivering 
what those people value.”). 
104 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 217. 
105 Cf. id. at 4 (“Investors part with their money willingly . . . .”). 
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that they provide all the information that market participants want, thereby allowing 
traders to more accurately value the securities being traded in the secondary market. 
That concept is all well and good, but it does not directly relate to primary offerings. 
Still, there is at least one sense in which information underproduction may be a 
concern in the context of primary offerings: a company making a primary offering 
may have information useful for the secondary market. A company that has not yet 
gone public itself may still possess information that affects the accurate valuation of 
publicly-traded companies. However, the knowledgeable company would still lack 
a full incentive to determine or disclose that information because it might not capture 
the full benefits of doing so. 
For instance, when Tesla held its IPO in 2010, it probably held certain 
information about electric cars that was relevant to the stock price for Ford or 
General Motors. Information underproduction could possibly pose an issue in such 
circumstances. Absent mandatory disclosure, Tesla may have found it inefficient to 
disclose that information because it might have been helpful to traders of Ford or 
GM, as these companies are direct competitors. Additionally, investors would have 
sound theoretical reason to fear that Tesla might not offer certain disclosures that 
would benefit their business rivals unless compelled to do so. Thus, information 
underproduction may have some relevance to the primary market. 
But this Article will not overstate the case. For one thing, the private incentives 
to offer precise “signals” of quality are at their strongest when dealing with primary 
offerings.106 For another, sophisticated actors in the primary markets, such as 
exchanges and underwriters, are in a position to demand (and receive) all the 
information they desire about the issuer. Thus, the primary context provides scholars 
with less reason to worry about information underproduction than does the 
secondary market. In addition, primary offerings occur relatively infrequently, on a 
one-off basis. Conversely, the secondary market goes on every day. So, information 
underproduction is only a problem in the primary market as a one-time issue for each 
issuer, as opposed to an ongoing problem. 
Furthermore, as a general rule, IPO companies are smaller and younger than 
those already public. As a result, IPO companies do not have much information that 
the market otherwise lacks. For example, the following companies conducted the 
largest IPOs on the New York Stock Exchange in November 2018: CNFinance 
Holdings, Eton Pharmaceuticals, Vapotherm, Weidai, Bain Capital Specialty 
Finance, and TuanChe.107 None of these are household names, and none likely hold 
anywhere near the same amount of market-relevant information that already-public 
companies do. The information they provide (or not) in connection with their IPOs 
hold only slight relevance for the companies whose securities are already traded on 
the secondary market. 
  
                                               
106 See supra Section II.B (explaining the concept of signaling). 
107 IPO Data, NYSE, www.nyse.com/ipo-center/recent-ipo [https://perma.cc/TF78-
3LDQ] (last visited Feb. 4, 2019). 
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For all these reasons, the concept of information underproduction has only very 
limited relevance in the context of a primary market. Although there are exceptions, 
information underproduction is generally not an issue in the primary market. 
 
B.  Primary Offerings Do Not Necessarily Require Full Mandatory Disclosure 
 
As this Article just demonstrated, the two theoretical bases underlying the 
modern theory of mandatory disclosure—agency costs and information 
underproduction—have little to no relevance to the primary market. It follows from 
this analysis that mandatory disclosure is not a necessary component of a well-
functioning primary market. Furthermore, the theory of voluntary disclosure—that 
founders and companies have a private incentive to provide the optimal level of 
information that shareholders would desire—applies clearly and directly to primary 
markets.108 Primary public stock markets thus appear to be free of the market failures 
that led to the modern theory in favor of mandatory disclosure.109 
Nevertheless, the anticipated benefits of mandatory disclosure in a secondary 
market could indirectly impact the primary market.110 For instance, if a primary 
investor expects that corporate management will be well-behaved thanks to 
mandatory disclosure imposed as part of the secondary market, she will pay a higher 
price to the company than she would otherwise.111 But this argument is really just 
another in favor of mandatory disclosure in the secondary market. Therefore, this 
argument is not directly relevant to whether the law should mandate disclosure for 
primary offerings. 
One final objection to the idea presented here is that an IPO lasts a millisecond, 
while the secondary trading of the shares sold to the public will go on every business 
day, potentially for decades. Even if a company were excused from mandatory 
disclosure in the IPO (primary market), this excuse would hardly make a difference 
because the company would be immediately subject to mandatory disclosure in the 
secondary market where its shares would later trade. This objection is true, as far as 
it goes, but it also shows how wedded scholars are to our traditional conceptions of 
a public stock market. 
Yes, a company that does an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange (or similar) 
is immediately subject to mandatory disclosure under the Securities Exchange Act 
                                               
108 Romano, supra note 3, at 2374 (“Because firms need capital and investors need 
information, firms have powerful incentives to disclose information if they are to compete 
successfully for funds against alternative investment opportunities.”). 
109 It is possible that other, unidentified market failures (other than agency costs or 
information underproduction) could support mandatory disclosure in the primary market, 
providing an objection to this Article’s claim. Yet, as far as research reveals, the existing 
literature does not appear to introduce any additional theories that could apply to the primary 
market context. 
110 KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 245 (“[T]he prospect of a liquid [secondary] 
market is relevant to primary markets.”). 
111 See id. 
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of 1934 once it enters the secondary market.112 But the New York Stock Exchange 
is not the only type of public stock market, theoretically. One could, for instance, 
conceive that a public stock market could operate solely in a primary capacity, with 
no secondary trading. Shareholders would buy shares straight from the company and 
then hold them, rather than trade them.113 Such a primary-only market could truly 
be free of mandatory disclosure. The equity crowdfunding market in New Zealand 
is one real-world example of a primary-only market, as this Article explains in Part 
III. 
Alternatively, the United States could have some sort of reduced disclosure rule 
for IPOs, and then ramp up the level of disclosure over time once the shares begin 
trading in the secondary market. Thus, the disclosure rule would be more like a 
gradual on-ramp than an immediate jump to full disclosure obligations. The “on 
ramp” provisions of the JOBS Act of 2012 provide an example of this idea in 
practice.114 Essentially, these rules allow relatively small companies (“emerging 
growth companies”) to launch an IPO without complying with the full level of 
mandatory disclosure and then to provide only limited disclosure for several years 
thereafter.115 After a set number of years, these issuers become subject to the 
ordinary disclosure obligations of public companies. This model is consistent with 
the thesis herein. 
To summarize, because the modern theory in favor of mandatory disclosure is 
built on concepts that relate almost exclusively to the secondary market, this theory 
has little persuasive force when it comes to the primary market. This concept leads 
directly to the seemingly radical suggestion that the United States can have a well-
functioning public stock market without mandatory disclosure, as long as this market 
is limited to primary offerings. 
 
C.  A Resolution to the Persistent Disagreement Over the Modern Theory 
 
The analysis presented here also may explain why scholars continue to dissent 
against the modern theory of mandatory disclosure, even after all these decades. 
Those in support of mandatory disclosure tend to focus on the secondary market, 
while those in dissent tend to focus on the primary market. If the thesis of the present 
work is accepted, then both camps may be correct. 
Treatises and articles in support or defense of the modern theory are full of 
terms like “market price,” “traders,” and “liquidity.” These ideas all relate to the 
secondary market, not the primary market.116 For example, one key article by Merritt 
                                               
112 See Benston, supra note 80, at 133. 
113 In lieu of an ‘exit’ through the secondary market, such shareholders could, say, have 
the right to sell their shares back to the company (maybe once a year) at an appraised value. 
Other alternatives are possible. 
114 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, Tit. I, 126 Stat. 315 
(2012) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78a (2012)). 
115 Id. 
116 E.g., KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 244–55; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. 
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Fox explains that shareholders benefit from mandatory “periodic disclosure” 
because it “increases the effectiveness of a number of devices—the shareholder vote, 
shareholder enforcement of management’s fiduciary duties, and the hostile takeover 
threat—that work to limit the ability of managers to deviate from acting in the 
shareholders’ best interests.”117 Each of the devices Professor Fox cites are features 
of the secondary market only; they have no relevance to a primary market. 
Likewise, Professor Coffee’s classic article in support of the modern theory is 
based primarily on the idea that information is a “public good” and mandatory 
disclosure is therefore needed to ensure accurate pricing of securities traded on the 
secondary market.118 In a similar vein, one leading treatise describes the “principal 
purpose” of mandatory disclosure to be that it “enhance[s] price informativeness 
[among] traders” in the secondary market, who “impound new information into price 
extremely rapidly,” which “enhances liquidity [and] allows companies to use market 
prices as benchmarks of performance.”119 Market prices, traders, research, and 
informative prices all refer to the secondary market of securities trading rather than 
the primary market of securities issuance. 
In contrast, the few scholars who dissent from the modern theory often focus 
on the primary market. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel, for instance, use 
the example of “a firm that wants to issue new securities” to explain their influential 
challenge to the modern theory.120 Professor Roberta Romano similarly observes, 





                                               
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, passim (1984); 
Coffee, supra note 6, at 726–27. 
117 Fox, supra note 61, at 1355–56. 
118 Coffee, supra note 6, at 734–37 (“[Because] the securities market [is] the principal 
allocative mechanism for investment capital, the behavior of securities prices is important 
not so much because of their distributive consequences on investors but more because of 
their effect on allocative efficiency. In this light, it is important not only that the game be 
fair, but that it be accurate—that is, that capital be correctly priced. Depending on a firm’s 
share price, its cost for obtaining capital will be either too high or low as compared to the 
cost that would prevail in a perfectly efficient market.”). 
119 KRAAKMAN (2017), supra note 81, at 247; see also, e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, supra 
note 116, at 638–39 (suggesting that the “market participants [who benefit] most from 
mandatory disclosure . . . [are] members of the professional trading community”). 
120 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 288–89 (“These arguments [in support 
of the modern theory] share a problem, because they leap from the benefit of disclosure to 
the benefit of mandatory disclosure . . . . Take a firm that wants to issue new securities . . . .”). 
But cf. id. at 289 (“Self-induced disclosure occurs in the secondary market too.”); Mahoney, 
supra note 3, at 1465 (“It is more analytically tidy to consider new-issue disclosure as a 
species of corporate law (albeit federal corporate law) than as a portion of the regulatory 
system for securities markets.”). 
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incentives to disclose information if they are to compete successfully for funds 
against alternative investment opportunities.”121 She similarly observes that the 
prospect of future primary offerings can drive secondary-market disclosure itself.122 
With an appreciation that the principles underlying the modern theory in favor 
of mandatory disclosure are largely inapplicable to the primary market, one can see 
that the supposed conflict between supporters and dissenters may be more apparent 
than real. In truth, they each may be correct in their domain. Supporters may well be 
right that mandatory disclosure is beneficial or necessary in secondary markets. And 
dissenters may likewise be correct that mandatory disclosure is useless or harmful 
in primary markets. 
From time to time, scholars have recognized this possibility, although they have 
not dwelt on it. Professor Coffee, for instance, has acknowledged that the dissenters’ 
argument “does seem to have some validity as applied to initial public offerings and, 
to a lesser extent, to all primary distributions.”123 Professor Palmiter has likewise 
suggested that the argument in favor of mandatory disclosure is “flawed” because it 
“assumes market failure without distinguishing between primary and secondary 
markets.”124 More recently, Professors Henderson and Haeberle have taken care to 
exclude the primary market from their ongoing discussion of federal securities 
regulation.125 
More commonly, however, supporters and opponents of mandatory disclosure 
have failed to expressly delineate between the primary and secondary markets, 
leading them to speak past one another.126 One contribution of the present work is 
to highlight the important distinction between primary and secondary markets and 
to show that these parties may both be right. In addition, there is an interesting 
interplay between the two, with companies voluntarily providing information for 
traders on the secondary market to facilitate future primary offerings. Even so, it 
behooves scholars to keep the two markets separate for purposes of mandatory 
disclosure. 
 
                                               
121 Romano, supra note 3, at 2374. 
122 Id. (“[S]tudies have found that the quantity and quality of publicly traded firms’ 
voluntary disclosures (such as earnings forecasts) are positively correlated with the issuance 
of securities.”). 
123 Coffee, supra note 6, at 746 (saying that while “the theory of voluntary disclosure” 
was not persuasive with regard to “secondary market trading,” it “does seem to have some 
validity as applied to initial public offerings and, to a lesser extent, to all primary 
distributions”). 
124 Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 128–29 (1999). 
125 Haeberle & Henderson, supra note 30, at 385 n.3 (“We do not address the 
disclosures that must be made when firms first sell stock to the public in an IPO. Instead, we 
focus on only ongoing disclosure by public firms as well as disclosures associated with 
secondary offerings of securities by the same.”). 
126 See infra Section II.A.2.C. 
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IV.  REAL-WORLD EXAMPLE: EQUITY CROWDFUNDING IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
The core claim of this Article—that the modern theory of mandatory disclosure 
is generally inapplicable to primary offerings—has thus far been premised entirely 
on theoretical arguments and ideas. To buttress the claim, this Part presents an 
empirical report on equity crowdfunding in New Zealand—a real-world public 
market for primary offerings that operates without mandatory disclosure. As this 
Part will show, New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market functions well in the 
absence of mandatory disclosure and, indeed, has outpaced the American system, 
which retained mandatory disclosure as part of its equity crowdfunding law.127 
 
A.  Background on Equity Crowdfunding 
 
Equity crowdfunding is a novel way for a company to make a primary offering 
to the public through Internet-based platforms (or portals) and is based on the prior 
practice of “reward” crowdfunding, as on Kickstarter and similar websites.128 
Reward crowdfunding is an Internet-based marketplace for the financing of 
entrepreneurial projects whereby an artist or entrepreneur posts to a dedicated 
website a description of the project she wants to pursue, the amount of money she 
needs to fund it, and usually promises some sort of reward or benefit to those who 
provide funding. Members of the public—the crowd—peruse the various projects 
available on the website, decide which one(s) they want to support, and then pledge 
their money to the cause. If and when a given project reaches its target funding 
amount, the platform collects the money and transmits it to the entrepreneur. On 
some crowdfunding sites (including Kickstarter), if a project fails to reach the target, 
the platform nullifies the pledges, and no money changes hands. This is known as 
an “all-or-nothing” rule. 
For example, a rock band that wants to record an album might post the idea 
along with a sample track and ask the crowd to contribute 20 dollars per person. In 
return, the band promises to send a copy of the CD once the band completes it. The 
band uses the money it collects upfront to rent a recording studio, hire a producer, 
et cetera. This simple idea has grown into a multi-billion-dollar market in less than 
a decade. Kickstarter alone reports that users have contributed more than 4 billion 
dollars on its website since its founding in 2009.129 
Equity crowdfunding is based on reward crowdfunding and simply extends the 
concept to investments.130 It works just like reward crowdfunding except that, 
instead of receiving a tangible reward like a CD from a band, the financial backers 
                                               
127 Portions of this Part are adapted from Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New 
Zealand, supra note 23, at 246–54, and Schwartz, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 930–37. 
128 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1459–60. 
129 Stats, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=global-footer 
[https://perma.cc/8SRB-G3VU] (last updated Sept. 12, 2019). 
130 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1460. 
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get a share of stock or some other security, such as a share in the band’s profits on 
the sale of the CD. 
This novel method of online investing holds great promise, but it also violates 
the usual legal rules for making a public offer of securities in the United States. For, 
under the Securities Act of 1933, a company is legally required to “register” any 
shares of stock, bonds or other securities before offering them to the public.131 As 
demonstrated in Part II.A, this registration process calls for copious mandatory 
disclosure about the company and the securities to be offered,132 the costs of which 
can be millions of dollars. This cost presents an obvious hurdle for the startups and 
small businesses that might look to crowdfunding for financial capital.133 
Thus over the past few years, the United States and other countries, including 
New Zealand, sought to legalize and encourage equity crowdfunding by amending 
their securities laws to expressly exempt small-scale equity crowdfunding from the 
usual registration requirement.134 In the United States, the JOBS Act of 2012 
exempted equity crowdfunding from the registration rules, including the normal 
rules of mandatory disclosure, but then added a different, more simplified set of 
mandatory disclosures for companies to make.135 New Zealand went even further, 
exempting equity crowdfunding from mandatory disclosure entirely.136 
 
B.  New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding: No Mandatory Disclosure 
 
New Zealand legalized equity crowdfunding in the Financial Markets Conduct 
Act of 2013. That statute was expressly modeled on the American JOBS Act of the 
prior year.137 However, the New Zealand version is much more liberal (in the classic 
sense; New Zealanders would call it ‘light-handed’) in that it imposes very few rules 
and regulations on the practice.138 Most importantly, issuing companies have no 
                                               
131 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2012). 
132 See 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2018) (instructions for filing registration statement). 
133 Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1468–70. 
134 The United States, New Zealand and other jurisdictions have all included an annual 
issuance cap of about $1 million in their equity crowdfunding laws, meaning that a company 
may only issue $1 million worth of securities per year through this exemption. 
135 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112–106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306 
(2012) (codified 15 U.S.C. §§77a, 77b, 77d, 77g, 77r, 78c, 78a, 78c, 78l, and 78o). 
136 FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT ACT 2013, Schedule 1, § 6(1)(a) (“An offer of 
financial products to a person (A) does not require disclosure under Part 3 of this Act if the 
offer is through a licensed intermediary in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary 
services to (A).”); FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATIONS 2014 § 184(a) (defining 
equity crowdfunding as a “prescribed intermediary service”). 
137 OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF COMMERCE, FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT 
REGULATIONS PAPER 4 — LICENSING REGIMES 136–43 (Cabinet Bus. Comm. PrintBusiness 
Committee June 2013). 
138 See Henry William Hillind, Exploiting the Crowd: The New Zealand Response to 
Equity Crowd Funding, 21 N.Z. BUS. L.Q. 46, 52 (2015) (describing the New Zealand 
approach to crowdfunding as “more liberal compared to international jurisdictions”). 
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mandatory disclosure obligations under the New Zealand crowdfunding law. This 
lack of obligations greatly simplifies the process and lowers the cost of selling shares 
to the public.139 In the United States, although the JOBS Act simplified the 
disclosure process for crowdfunding issuers, issuers are still legally required to 
provide significant and specific financial and business disclosures.140 In New 
Zealand, this is not the case. 
New Zealand relies on private ordering rather than legal obligations to achieve 
effective disclosure.141 Hence, New Zealand crowdfunding platforms are required to 
implement “disclosure arrangements” that are “adequate” to provide potential 
investors with information relevant to their decision to invest; but the content, 
manner, and style of disclosure is a business decision for the platform.142 
Furthermore, issuing companies need not file anything at all with the FMA (New 
Zealand’s SEC-equivalent). This model is very different from the American model 
of equity crowdfunding with its requirement that issuers file a standardized 
government-drafted form (Form C) with 25 specific items of mandatory 
disclosure.143 
 
C.  Empirical Report on New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 
 
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market presents a useful test-case for this 
Article’s critique of the modern theory of mandatory disclosure. This Article argues 
that, because the underpinnings of the modern theory relate to the secondary market, 
a primary securities market should be able to function well without mandatory 
disclosure. By legalizing an equity crowdfunding market with no mandatory 
disclosure, New Zealand has put this claim to the test. What has this experiment 
shown? 
New Zealand’s liberal model, including its abandonment of mandatory 
disclosure, has generated a successful equity crowdfunding market that compares 
favorably with American venture capitalism (VC) and angel investment. 
Furthermore, from a financial perspective, New Zealand has greatly outpaced the 
United States (who, like most jurisdictions, retained mandatory disclosure for its 
crowdfunding market), and has suffered no fraud and very few business failures. 
                                               
139 FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT ACT 2013, Schedule 1, § 6(1)(a) (“An offer of 
financial products to a person (A) does not require disclosure under Part 3 of this Act if the 
offer is through a licensed intermediary in the course of supplying prescribed intermediary 
services to (A).”); FINANCIAL MARKETS CONDUCT REGULATIONS 2014 § 184(a) (defining 
equity crowdfunding as a “prescribed intermediary service”). 
140 Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act §302, 126 Stat. at 315–321. 
141 See infra Section III.D. 
142 Financial Markets Conduct Regulations 2014, Reg. 186(1)(d). 
143 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201(a)–(y) (2018) (“An issuer offering or selling securities [via 
equity crowdfunding] . . . must file with the Commission and provide to investors and the 
relevant intermediary the following information . . . .”); 17 C.F.R. § 239.900 (2018) (Form 
C). 
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In the first year of equity crowdfunding in New Zealand,144 27 crowdfunding 
campaigns were launched, and 21 of those succeeded in reaching their financial 
target, indicating a 78% success rate.145 The 21 successful campaigns collectively 
raised a total of $10 million.146 The average amount raised was about $500,000, with 
two campaigns reaching the legal crowdfunding limit of NZ$2 million.147 These 
numbers represent a significant contribution of capital to New Zealand 
entrepreneurs, as one can see when comparing them to the amounts invested by New 
Zealand VC and angel investors. In 2014, New Zealand angels invested $45 million 
in 118 deals,148 and New Zealand VC funds likewise contributed $45 million in total, 
spread across 62 investments.149 Equity crowdfunding’s first-year total of $10 
million and 21 deals, while lower than the totals of VCs or angels, is in the same 
ballpark. 
New Zealand’s numbers are even more impressive when compared to the 
American experience. In its first year of operation, from mid-2016 to mid-2017, the 
United States saw 211 crowdfunding campaigns in total, 112 of which were 
successful, thus representing a 53% success rate.150 The total amount raised by all 
successful campaigns was about $35 million.151 The average amount raised was 
about $300,000, with nine campaigns hitting the $1 million maximum.152 
To properly compare New Zealand and the United States, one must account for 
the fact that the American economy is about 100 times as large as that of New 
Zealand.153 If one were to scale New Zealand’s figures up by a factor of 100, which 
                                               
144 The analysis here compares the first year of crowdfunding in each jurisdiction. In 
the United States, this was 2016–17; in New Zealand, this was 2014–15. 
145 New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding—1st Year in Review, CROWDREADY (Aug. 18, 
2015). 
146 Id. The currency conversions in this section are based on a 0.8 conversion rate 
between the New Zealand Dollar and the United States Dollar, which was the approximate 
rate at the time in question (2014–2015), and are rounded for the sake of simplicity. 
147 Id.  
148 NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT, TOWARDS 2025, BUSINESS GROWTH AGENDA 
PROGRESS REPORT (Sept. 8, 2015) https://www.beehive.govt.nz/sites/default/files/Business 
%20Growth%20Agenda%20-%20Towards%202025.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2J4-J33Y]. 
149 NEW ZEALAND PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL CAP. ASS’N, NEW ZEALAND 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL MONITOR: 2014 FULL YEAR REVIEW (2014) 
https://www.nzvca.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/1527715_NZPEVC-Monitor_web 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/PYB9-YDEB]. 
150 CCA Regulation Crowdfunding Indices, CROWDFUNDING CAP. ADVISORS (July 28, 
2016), https://crowdfundcapitaladvisors.com/cca-reg-cf-index/ [https://perma.cc/9NT6-
VE7F]; see also The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, WEFUNDER, 
https://wefunder.com/stats [https://perma.cc/B3RP-Y3ZE] (last visited July 1, 2019). 
151 The Current Status of Regulation Crowdfunding, supra note 150. 
152 Id. 
153 The gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States is about $18 trillion and the 
GDP of New Zealand is about $175 billion (at the time of writing). GDP (current US$), 
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD? [https://perma.cc 
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is only fair, New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market would be orders of 
magnitude larger than that of the United States. Based on such a calculation, New 
Zealand had 13 times as many campaigns as the United States, those campaigns had 
a success rate of nearly 80%, compared to the American rate of about 50%, and New 
Zealand companies raised 30 times as much money as did their American 
counterparts. 
Moreover, looking at the history of New Zealand equity crowdfunding, with 
dozens of companies funded and tens of millions of dollars raised, not a single 
funded company has been revealed to be a fraud, and there has been just one 
liquidation.154 Admittedly, the time period is short (just four years), and New 
Zealand’s economy, in general, has done well over that time, meaning that fraud 
may yet be revealed in some future period when economic conditions are less 
forgiving. In addition, recent equity crowdfunding in the United States has grown 
significantly since its first year in operation.155 Even taking this growth into account, 
New Zealand’s market remains an order of magnitude larger than that of the United 
States, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of New Zealand’s system. 
 
D.  Private Ordering in New Zealand Equity Crowdfunding 
 
How did New Zealand generate such a successful equity crowdfunding market 
without mandatory disclosure? First, because New Zealand’s legal regulations are 
simple and few, compliance costs appear to be much lower than in a traditional IPO 
or even in an American equity crowdfunding campaign.156 Second, and more 
importantly for present purposes, New Zealand’s crowdfunding system depends on 
private actors to organize the market, keep it honest, and make it work well, all 
without direct participation on the part of the government.157 Pursuant to this design, 
                                               
/S2HA-VMSX] (last visited June 25, 2019). 
154 Interview with Hayley Buckley, Partner, Wynn Williams, in Auckland, N.Z. (May 
18, 2017); Paul McBeth, Balex Marine, Snowball Crowdfunder Participant, Sunk by High 
Costs, Slow Sales, NAT’L BUS. REV. (May 17, 2017) (reporting on the first crowdfunding 
company to liquidate). 
155 Since Title III of the Jobs Act went into effect, the number of equity crowdfunding 
offerings has increased each year. In 2016, during the first seven months that Regulation 
Crowdfunding was in effect, American companies launched 188 equity crowdfunding 
campaigns. In 2017, the number of offerings rose to 514, and in 2018, this number rose again 
to 732 offerings, an increase of 42% from the prior year. Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding 
Issuers in the United States, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2019). Similarly, the 
total amount raised in 2017 was $71 million; in 2018 that grew to $109 million. The 2018 
State of Regulation Crowdfunding, CROWDFUND CAP. ADVISORS, (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://cdn.crowdfundinsider.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/CCA-2018-State-of-
Regulation-Crowdfunding-Summary-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FYZ-DBG7]. 
156 See Schwartz, Equity Crowdfunding in New Zealand, supra note 23, at 252–54 
(discussing compliance costs under the U.S. crowdfunding policies).  
157 See id. at 272–73.  
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market participants have established numerous effective modes of private ordering 
or private governance, the most important of which are “gatekeepers” and 
“syndication.” 
First, New Zealand’s law envisions that the licensed crowdfunding platforms 
would act as “gatekeepers” that only allow legitimate and promising companies to 
access the crowd.158 Platforms have a direct economic interest in establishing and 
maintaining a reputation as a reliable place for investors to put their money.159 If 
they allow fraudulent or low-quality companies onto their site, and investors lose 
money, those investors will not come back, and the platform will go out of 
business.160 Knowing all this, platforms can be expected to only invite legitimate 
and sound companies to participate on their sites.161 The platform’s gatekeeping role 
thus protects investors and gives them the confidence to participate in the market. 
In practice, New Zealand platforms take their gatekeeper role seriously and are 
very selective in deciding which companies to allow to list on their site.162 They 
understand how vital it is to protect their reputation and accordingly exclude 
companies that are unlikely to succeed, or that have any chance of being fraudulent. 
Snowball Effect, for instance, lists only 2% of the hundreds of companies that want 
to crowdfund on their site, “mostly because they’re not investment ready.”163 The 
platform is selective because, according to the company, “we’ve got our own 
reputation [to protect and because] we want investors to get what we think are 
interesting opportunities that are ready for public investment.”164 This focus on 
                                               
158 Crowdfunding Platforms, FINANCIAL MARKETS AUTHORITY, https://www.fma.govt. 
nz/compliance/role/crowdfunding-platforms/your-on-going-obligations/ [https://perma.cc/ 
NR47-VT6L] (last updated July 4, 2019). 
159 See Interview with Simeon Burnett, CEO, Snowball Effect, in Auckland, N.Z. (Feb. 
27, 2017). 
160 See Mackenzie McCarty, Cabinet Gives Green Light to Equity Crowdfunding, N.Z. 
Lawyer (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.nzlawyermagazine.co.nz/news/cabinet-gives-green-
light-to-equity-crowdfunding-184672.aspx [https://perma.cc/3GQX-HMPT] (“It’s . . . really 
going to be quite self-fulfilling, because the platform will be incentivized to have the best 
companies - they really don’t want any failures on their platforms. And that’s aligning them 
absolutely with the interests of investors.”) (quoting Hayley Buckley, a law partner working 
alongside the crowdfunding platform, “Snowball Effect”).  
161 See id. (discussing the strict licensing process). 
162 See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159 (discussing the rigorous listing 
requirements). 
163 See Schwartz, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 932 n.282 (“98% of companies we 
point in another direction.”) (citation omitted); see also John Anthony, New Zealand 
Crowdfunding Platforms Gearing Up for Big 2016, STUFF (Jan. 21, 2016, 5:42 PM), 
http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/75424341/new-zealand-crowdfunding-platforms 
-gearing-up-for-big-2016 [https://perma.cc/75KG-7SVK] (“Snowball Effect had been 
approached by hundreds of companies wanting to crowdfund but it was selective about which 
were chosen for the platform.”). 
164 See Anthony, supra note 163 (“We need to make sure that companies are suitable 
for our offering and a lot of companies aren’t.”) (quoting Snowball Effect CEO Simeon 
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selectivity, rather than inclusivity, is not unique to Snowball Effect but is rather 
standard practice in the industry.165 
Second, “syndication” is where the crowd invests alongside a large and 
sophisticated “lead” investor. This method comes directly from angel investors.166 
Under this model, one “active” or “lead” angel, presumably an expert in the relevant 
industry, researches a company and the proposed terms of investment and then 
reports back to the rest of the angels in the group.167 The other angels in the group 
play a “passive” role; they trust in the expertise and diligence of the lead angel.168 
The distinctive legal regime in New Zealand has allowed syndication to 
develop as a key method for privately regulating the country’s equity crowdfunding 
market. Unlike the United States (as well as practically every other country), New 
Zealand’s crowdfunding law imposes no cap on the amount an investor may 
contribute.169 This decision was a conscious one on the part of the government. New 
Zealand specifically designed this system, at least in part, to facilitate large 
investments by lead investors and syndication by the rest of the crowd, just like in 
traditional angel investing.170 Hence, under New Zealand law, an angel investor is 
legally permitted to invest hundreds of thousands of dollars through a crowdfunding 
campaign, making it cost-effective to undertake the burden of acting as a lead 
investor.171 The lead investor often makes a very sizable investment herself, 
sometimes as much as $500,000 at a time.172 Such an amount would be unlawful 
under American law but is perfectly legal in New Zealand.173 
                                               
Burnett). 
165 See Nathan Rose, Equity Crowdfunding Evolutions Expected to Take Place in New 
Zealand, #NZENTREPRENEUR (Feb. 22, 2016), https://nzentrepreneur.co.nz/equity-
crowdfunding-evolutions-expected-to-take-place-in-new-zealand/ [https://perma.cc/7SA8-
UVJ8] (“Each equity crowdfunding marketplace [in New Zealand] is ‘curated’ or ‘vetted’ to 
some extent.”). 
166 See Dale A. Oesterle, Intermediaries in Internet Offerings: The Future Is Here, 50 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 533, 542 (2015) (“The syndicates shadow trade, as coinvestors, on 
the trades of ‘lead angels’ or ‘angel advisers.’”).  
167 See id. at 542–43 (“[T]he angel takes the lead in identifying the investment 
opportunity and negotiating the terms on behalf of their syndicate.”). 
168 See id. at 542 (noting that passive investors are given the option to observe and 
follow in the angels’ lead). 
169 Nathan Rose, How the World Regulates Equity Crowdfunding, REG. REV. (June 26, 
2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/06/26/rose-how-world-regulates-equity-crowd 
funding/ [https://perma.cc/X44B-5GEC]. 
170  See Interview with James Hartley, Manager, Financial Markets Policy, N.Z. 
Ministry of Bus. Innovation & Emp’t, in Auckland, N.Z. (Apr. 4, 2017) (noting the 
similarities to angel investing). 
171  See Oesterle, supra note 166, at 543 (“The lead angels’ or angel advisers’ economic 
incentive to participate is a form of carried interest, a slice of the profits of the syndicate 
returns.”). 
172  See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159. 
173 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(ii) (2012) (establishing $100,000 as the most that any 
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In practice, lead investors have become a very important component of New 
Zealand’s equity crowdfunding marketplace.174 Like in an angel group, the lead 
investor conducts research on the company, and the rest of the crowd comes along 
for the ride. Professional investors, including angels and VCs, sometimes play the 
role of cornerstone investor.175 They serve to lend credibility to an offer; others take 
the fact that someone has bought a large block of shares as a signal that the company 
is sound and the valuation is fair.176 Commonly, a lead investor will arrange to 
contribute a large sum to a crowdfunding campaign in advance, thus providing it 
with momentum from the first day. The experience in New Zealand shows that lead 
or cornerstone investors have become an important component of the crowdfunding 
marketplace.177 
In conclusion, New Zealand’s experience shows that private ordering can serve 
as an effective substitute for mandatory disclosure. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Article challenges the idea that mandatory disclosure is truly necessary for 
primary offerings of securities, as scholars have largely presupposed until now. The 
conceptual underpinnings of the modern theory of mandatory disclosure—concern 
                                               
individual may annually invest in crowdfunding companies). In the United States, 
syndication is not a viable model for crowdfunding due to the structure of the securities 
crowdfunding law in place there. The JOBS Act places a low legal limit on the total amount 
that a person may invest in all crowdfunding companies each year. The upshot is that most 
Americans are limited to about $3,000–$5,000 per year or less—and this amount is not per 
investment, but rather per year—making it economically infeasible for any one person to 
take on the role of lead investor. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(B)(i) (2012). The investor cap is 
simply too low to make it worthwhile for a lead angel to spend the time and effort it takes to 
find an appropriate investment and conduct adequate due diligence. 
174  See Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159. 
175  See Calida Smylie, Equity Crowdfunding Numbers Slump After First Year, NAT’L 
BUS. REV. (Nov. 7, 2014) (describing “at least four campaigns [as] being partially led by a 
professional investor”); see also Brendan Manning, Riding the New Wave of Equity-Raising, 
N.Z. HERALD, (July 23, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article 
.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=11485195 [https://perma.cc/HF9S-RLLU] (“We’re seeing some 
angels and VCs integrating equity crowdfunding as a step in their investment strategy.”) 
(quoting Armillary Private Captial director David Wallace). 
176 See Shaun Edlin, Pre-arranged Capital and Momentum: Is Real Money Being 
Raised Through Online Marketplaces?, SNOWBALL EFFECT (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.snowballeffect.co.nz/blog/lessons-weve-learnt-about-momentum [https://perm 
a.cc/WMJ9-UDKX] (noting that a lead investor helps validate the offer price); see also 
Interview with Simeon Burnett, supra note 159. 
177 See Edlin, supra note 176 (“We encourage companies raising through Snowball to 
seek a credible investor to lead their offer . . . . To date, only three offers through our 
marketplace have failed to reach their minimum investment target . . . the one thing all three 
offers had in common was that they lacked a credible lead investor for the round.”); Interview 
with Hayley Buckley, Partner, Wynn Williams, in Auckland, N.Z. (May 18, 2017). 
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over agency costs and information underproduction—as persuasive as they may be 
in the context of secondary markets, hold very little relevance to primary offerings. 
This profound insight challenges the very foundations of modern securities law in 
the United States and around the world. Furthermore, as a matter of empirical reality, 
New Zealand’s equity crowdfunding market represents an example of a successful 
public market for primary offerings that operates through private ordering, not 
mandatory disclosure. 
In light of this argument and evidence, it is no longer tenable to simply say that 
public securities markets require mandatory disclosure because of agency costs and 
information underproduction. Rather, scholars of securities law should acknowledge 
that the modern theory may only apply to secondary markets, not primary ones, and 
adjust our conversations about mandatory disclosure accordingly. Going forward, 
scholars and policymakers should keep an open mind to the possibility that a primary 
securities market open to the public could potentially operate in a socially optimal 
way by abandoning mandatory disclosure. Equity crowdfunding in New Zealand is 
one example of a privately ordered primary securities market, and others may follow 
its lead. 
